Fwd: Re: Re: Fwd: Unlocking for Plasma Active 2

[Carl Symons]

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Carl Symons <carlsymons at gmail.com>
Date: Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 10:05 AM
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Fwd: Unlocking for Plasma Active 2
To: Martin Gräßlin <mgraesslin at kde.org>


On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 3:27 AM, Martin Gräßlin <mgraesslin at kde.org> wrote:
> On Sunday 09 October 2011 11:17:13 Ivan Čukić wrote:
>> > Unless the whole disk is encrypted, if someone steals your device, he will
>> > get your data anyways. So unless we do encryption, the only purpose of
>> > the lock
>> Don't get me wrong, I didn't post this because I think it is bad to
>> provide a lockscreen like this, just to point out that it shouldn't
>> take too much time for us to:
>>
>> - devise a secure solution, since it can't be done
>> - having PAM integration as a prerequisite
> you are both right :-)
>
> Obviously we cannot create a system which is secure against attacks when the
> attacker has physical access to the system (cold boot attacks, grub attack).
> So we don't need to secure against that (same is true for general screen
> locker on desktop).
>
> On the other hand we have to make it so secure that it should hold against
> trivial attacks.
>
> Just an idea I had: what about doing something like face recognizion? We have
> a web cam...
>
> Cheers
> Martin
>>

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