[PATCH] Kwallet optional owner based access control

[Thiago Macieira]

On Thursday 10 April 2008 13:53:14 Jonathan Verner wrote:
> Maybe an even better approach would be to allow the user to
> mark some entries in the wallet as sensitive and these entries would
> always require the user to enter the 'master' password. These
> entries would also need to not be kept in memory.

If the attacker already has access to run programs on your machine, he can 
simply attach to the kded process and wait patiently for it to open the 
wallet. When the wallet gets opened, he reads everything from the decoded 
data.

Conclusion: any kind of protection you do for application calls is not going 
to have any effect. It would be necessary to make kwalletd a separate process 
and run as root to prevent attaching.

The application-name protection is just to avoid mistakes. It's not security.

-- 
  Thiago Macieira  -  thiago (AT) macieira.info - thiago (AT) kde.org
    PGP/GPG: 0x6EF45358; fingerprint:
    E067 918B B660 DBD1 105C  966C 33F5 F005 6EF4 5358
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