Review Request 117157: Unlock session via DBus

[Thiago Macieira]

Em dom 30 mar 2014, às 21:40:36, Thomas Lübking escreveu:
> On Sonntag, 30. März 2014 20:53:01 CEST, Thiago Macieira wrote:
> > Em dom 30 mar 2014, às 19:38:14, Thomas Lübking escreveu:
> >> Unlocking via a dbus command [that requires password authentication] is
> >> imo very problematic [because that will end up exposing the password
> >> on-disk]
> > 
> > How does the password end up on disk?
> 
> One of the use-cases in the linked bug is to invoke this by pam_usb or some
> bluetooth script. If the dbus call would require a password, the script
> could end up looking like 
> qdbus org.kde.kscreenlocker unlock 1ns3cur3

Don't pass the password via D-Bus. The call should just be:
	qdbus org.kde.kscreenlocker unlock 

> The development situation is special and actually what i had in mind when
> saying
> 
>    any way to circumvent authentication to this very session should be
> guarded by a special "knowwhatido" key [or require active authentication]

I've already authenticated by logging in, even if in another terminal. Just 
unlock the session already.

-- 
Thiago Macieira - thiago (AT) macieira.info - thiago (AT) kde.org
   Software Architect - Intel Open Source Technology Center
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