Review Request 117157: Unlock session via DBus

Martin Gräßlin mgraesslin at kde.org
Tue Apr 1 09:03:05 BST 2014


On Monday 31 March 2014 11:46:58 Thiago Macieira wrote:
> Em seg 31 mar 2014, às 08:55:05, Martin Gräßlin escreveu:
> > Personally I have to disagree. To me the graphical login is a an asset
> > which  needs to be protected in a stronger way. Access to a tty should not
> > equal access to the graphical system. The fact that X is broken should not
> > result in us adding further insecurities which need to be fixed up once we
> > transit to Wayland. The opposite has to happen: all the small security
> > issues we let in, because X was already broken need to get fixed. This
> > thread turned into a nice TODO list
> 
> I'm not asking for it to be insecure. I've already authenticated by logging
> in to the virtual console. So let me unlock my session via D-Bus.

I'm going to implement support for logind. I hope that this is sufficient for 
the usecase "unlock through DBus". In turn I will not allow a DBus call to 
unlock the screenlocker to go in.

Cheers
Martin
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