Small security patch for KTempFile

[Ian Reinhart Geiser]

Oswald Buddenhagen said:
> On Tue, Sep 07, 2004 at 11:56:10PM -0400, Ian Reinhart Geiser wrote:
>> Basicly it changes chown() to fchown() so the ownership operations are
>> done on the fd vs the filename.
>>
> that's pretty much pointless, as you have a race between creating the
> directory and changing/using it anyway. some things just have to be
> trusted ...
Isn't this the definition of a race condition?  The idea is that under
heavy system load (ie an attack) one can manipulate a file out from  under
a user.  Granted I think this might be a moot point when using KIO since
most people don't use the actual file handle, just the name generated by
KTempFile.

While not an obvious security hole, i don't see a problem with using a
safer  method where we can.

Cheers
   -ian reinhart geiser
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+-Ian Reinhart Geiser geiseri at sourcextreme.com
+-Vice President of Engineering
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